Unfortunately, there rarely seems to be any accountability for FAA incompetence. Did any heads roll for its lack of responsive oversight prior to the Collings crash? If so, I haven’t heard about it. This is managerial and cultural rot. If the organization has an overarching culture of individuals not owning problems and fixing them, nothing gets done.

What to do here? First, the NTSB is right to examine this issue, but is constrained in what it can do. To push the FAA into action would probably require congressional heat. But even that sometimes doesn’t yield results, since the agency is famous for ignoring congressional mandates with little accountability. It seems to me no new regulations are required. It’s reasonable to believe that if existing procedures had been followed, the Collings maintenance issues might have been identified and corrected, with the emphasis on might. It’s a better-than-nothing kind of thing. That applies to the Dillingham skydiving crash in Hawaii, too. Maintenance issues with the airplane were egregious and surveillance was nonexistent. Even cursory FAA inspections should have caught this. The FAA needs to do the basic job, never mind an enhanced one. //

I’d rather such a thing come from AOPA, USPA or EAA rather than the FAA. //

Ultimately, Part 91 flight safety depends much more on the judgment, skill and attitude of the pilot than does Part 121 or even 135 flying. In Part 91 flying, almost all the judgments are made in the cockpit without benefit of the overwatch of professional dispatchers, meteorologists and maintenance at the other end of a satellite phone or an ACARS message. We set it up that way. We want it that way. //

I believe the informed consent doctrine applies here. As I’ve reported before, this is how the FAA decided to oversee tourist spaceflight. Potential passengers are informed in detail that the vehicle is not certified and that they’re on their own for assuming the risk. In my view, it’s long past time to disabuse the public of the notion that Part 91 flying is “safe” and/or that the FAA can make it that way. The government can and should impose requirements to reduce risk in design and manufacturing of aircraft, maintenance and operations and adherence to regulations. That includes reasonable surveillance and enforcement. Reduced risk is not the same thing as safe.

So the answer to member Homendy’s question is no, there isn’t a practical way to anoint a Part 91 operation as “safe” because even enhanced surveillance—which the FAA has proven itself incapable of performing—is unlikely to deliver the public’s idea of flight safety, which is Delta Air Lines. Thumbs up to better surveillance and inspections and the FAA doing its basic job of assuring compliance and of enforcing against the really bad operators. We often know who they are ahead of any accident happening. But we should stop misleading the public that flight on Part 91 airplanes represents the same level of safety as airline flying. It does not.