Why treat places of worship differently? //

Late last night, the Supreme Court handed down an Order in the case of South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom. The Church had sought injunctive relief from California Governor Gavin Newsom’s Executive Order limiting attendance in places of worship to the lesser of 25% capacity or 100 people.

In the Order denying the injunction, Chief Justice Roberts sided with the liberal wing of the Court. Justice Brett Kavanaugh penned a dissent, joined by the other three conservative justices.

The primary distinction drawn between the majority and the dissent is their characterization of places of worship in relation to other secular gathering places. The majority likens churches and other places of worship to such secular gatherings as “lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time.” Roberts draws a distinction between these gatherings/venues, such as “grocery stores, banks, and laundromats,” noting that in those are venues “in which people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods.” //

Justice Kavanaugh notes that the State could simply impose the same (reasonable) occupancy caps across the board. But because it chose to impose stricter limits on certain venues, including houses of worship, while taking a looser approach with supermarkets, restaurants, and offices, the State appears to be discriminating against religion without providing a compelling justification for doing so